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Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service, 615 F.3d 1069, 2010 WL 2991395, 2010 U.S.
App. Lexis 15969 (9th Cir. Aug. 2, 2010).
Matt Newman

ABSTRACT
The Pit River Tribe of northern California sued the U.S. Forest service for not conducting
a full environmental impact statement on a proposed natural gas plant near a sacred site. The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that a district court‟s remand order to a Forest Service
administrative panel did not constitute a final decision by a court and therefore the order itself
was not subject to appellate review. Furthermore, the Court held that where a gas lease was
extended past its original terms and the extension was later rejected because it violated NEPA,
the lessee had a right to reclaim the original lease and was not subject to an open bid process.
I. INTRODUCTION
Pit River Tribe v. U.S. Forest Service was decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
on August 2, 2010.323 The court faced two issues on appeal. First, whether an appellate court
could exercise jurisdiction over a case where the trial court had not rendered a “final decision,”
and second, whether a geothermal lease should be subject to reclamation by the original
leaseholder at the end of litigation.324 The court‟s decision was not the first concerning the Pit
River Tribe‟s dispute with federal agencies and the Calpine Corporation, a natural resource
development firm.325 In this second round of litigation, the court found itself having to act as the
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interpreter of its first Pit River decision (Pit River I)326 because the disputes in second round of
litigation (Pit River II) were over what mandate was created by the court‟s order in Pit River I.327
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
In 1988, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) entered into two ten-year geothermal
lease agreements with a developer near Medicine Lake in Northern California, a place of cultural
significance to the Pit River Tribe (Pit River) and other Native American groups in the region. 328
These leases were later acquired by the Calpine Corporation, which proceeded to drill
exploratory wells in the leased areas.329 In 1995, after extensive exploration of the leases,
Calpine submitted a plan to the BLM and other federal agencies to build a power plant in an area
called Fourmile Hill.330 In May 1998, the BLM extended Calpine‟s original 1988 leases for five
years.331
In September 1998, the BLM and the other federal agencies released a complete
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) on the proposed Fourmile Hill power plant and in 2000
issued a Record of Decision (ROD) approving the plant.332 In 2002, BLM extended Calpine‟s
leases for an additional forty years.333 Subsequently, the Pit River Tribe filed suit in the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of California, claiming the federal agencies granting
the lease extensions had violated several federal laws during the leasing process, including the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and the National Historic Preservation Act
(NHPA).334
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III. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The district court entered summary judgment in favor of the agencies and Calpine, and
Pit River appealed.335 In Pit River I, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court‟s grant of
summary judgment for the agencies and Calpine and held the agencies should have completed an
EIS before granting the May 1998 lease extensions.336 Furthermore, the court held that the
September 1998 EIS on the Fourmile Hill power plant did not remedy the agencies‟ oversight.337
Because the 1998 and 2002 lease extensions were granted in violation of NEPA and NHPA, the
court held they must be undone.338 Furthermore, because the approval of the Fourmile Hill
power plant was based on lease extensions that were invalidated, the court held that Fourmile
Hill project must be halted as well.339 The court remanded the issue back to the district court
with orders to grant summary judgment in favor of Pit River.340 On remand, Calpine and the
agencies argued that the district court need only reconsider the May 1998 lease extensions and
the subsequent decisions based on those extensions, such as the Fourmile Hill approval and the
2002 lease extensions.341 Pit River argued that because the original 1988 leases had long since
expired and all lease extensions were invalidated by the Ninth Circuit, Calpine had no rights to
the geothermal deposit, and a new open bid leasing process must begin.342
As ordered by the Ninth Circuit, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
Pit River on the claims that the agencies violated federal law.343 However, the district court did
not accept Pit River‟s argument that the leasing process for the Medicine Lake site must start
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over, stating that a “mere finding of a NEPA violation does not automatically and retroactively
invalidate anything.”344 Rather, the district court remanded to the agencies with instructions to
perform the proper NEPA and NHPA reviews and deliver a new EIS for the future lease
extensions and the Fourmile Hill project, giving the BLM complete discretion to end or extend
the leases to the Medicine Lake site.345 Pit River again appealed to the Ninth Circuit.346
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN PIT RIVER II
A. Jurisdiction Issues
The Ninth Circuit's three-judge panel unanimously delivered the decision in Pit River
II.347 Before determining the merits of Pit River‟s claims, the court performed a detailed analysis
of several jurisdictional issues, focusing on whether the district court had issued a “final
decision,” and if not, whether the court still had jurisdiction to hear the case.348
Both Calpine and Pit River asserted that the court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1291.349 That section states that appellate jurisdiction extends only to the “final decisions of the
district courts.”350 Remand orders are generally not considered final decisions.351 The Ninth
Circuit established the exception to this general rule in Alsea Valley Alliance v. Department of
Commerce, where the court held that a remand order can be considered a final decision when:
(1) the district court conclusively resolves a separable legal issue,
(2) the remand order forces the agency to apply a potentially erroneous rule which may
result in a wasted proceeding, and
(3) review would, as a practical matter, be foreclosed if an immediate appeal were
unavailable.352
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In Alsea, a private party challenged a regulation passed by the National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS).353 The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Alsea and
remanded the matter to the NMFS.354 As a result of the remand, the Oregon Natural Resources
Council (ORNC), fearing the NMFS would not challenge the district court‟s remand, filed an
appeal with the Ninth Circuit to overturn the remand.355 The court held the district court‟s
remand order failed the third prong of the test and therefore, was not a final decision.356 The
court concluded that the appeal by the ONRC was unnecessary because the NMFS had not yet
acted on the remand order.357 The court reasoned that the ONRC would have as much power as
any concerned party in lobbying the NMFS to render a fair administrative decision.358 If after
the final administrative decision was made, the ONRC still felt wronged, it could file an appeal
of that decision, but until that point the ONRC had to exhaust its administrative remedies.359
In Pit River II, the court rejected the argument that the district court‟s remand order was a
final decision.360 The court stated that because no administrative decision had been made as a
result of the district court‟s remand, neither party could assert they have suffered from the
remand.361 The court noted that both parties would have the power to participate in the
administrative process in order to effect a fair decision.362 Until an administrative decision was
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reached by the agencies, the court held that any ruling would be unnecessary. 363 Because no
final decision was made, the court ruled it had no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.364
Arguing in the alternative, Calpine asserted jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1292(a)(1),
which gives an appellate court jurisdiction district court‟s interlocutory orders refusing an
injunction.365 In Alsea, the court described 12 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) as “„a limited exception to the
final-judgment rule,‟ which should be construed „narrowly.‟”366
Calpine‟s argument in favor of 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) jurisdiction was that the district
court refused Pit River‟s request for a preliminary injunction when remanded to the agencies
rather than setting the leases aside. The court rejected this interpretation of Pit River‟s argument,
pointing out that Pit River did not argue for an injunction cancelling or invalidating the leases,
but instead argued the leases could not be extended as a matter of law.367 As a result, the court
held it had no jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C § 1292(a)(1).368
Pit River's final argument was that appellate jurisdiction existed under the All Writs Act
(28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)) because the remand order of the district court violated the mandate of the
Pit River I decision.369 The All Writs Act allows appellate courts to issue writs of mandamus “to
confine an inferior court to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to compel it to
exercise its authority when it is its duty to do so.”370 When an order by a lower court violates the
mandate of a higher court, a writ of mandamus may be issued and appellate jurisdiction
established.371 Citing Vizcaino v. U.S. District Court, the court granted a writ of mandamus
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under the All Writs Act to determine whether the district court‟s remand order violated the
“letter and spirit” of the Pit River I decision.372
B. The Medicine Lake Leases
On appeal, Pit River argued that the district court‟s remand order was inappropriate
because the 1988 leases to the Medicine Lake site had expired and would thus be incapable of
extension after the ordered environmental reviews.373 In support of its argument, Pit River cited
passages from the Pit River I decision where the court stated that the lease extensions violated
NEPA and must be undone.374
The court first rejected Pit River‟s argument that, because the 1988 leases had expired
and the Pit River I decision invalidated any extension, a new open-bid leasing process must
begin.375 The court stated that allowing a litigant who successfully challenged a lease extension
to deprive a lessee of all contractual rights would set a dangerous precedent.376 The court
determined that the only way to interpret Pit River I was that where there is a successful
challenge to a lease extension the result can only be the undoing of the lease extension and not
the entire lease.377 The court held that the district court did not violate the mandate of Pit River I
when it ordered that the 1988 leases be deemed capable of extension after proper environmental
review by the federal agencies.378
In its conclusion, the court stated that it would “substantially” uphold the remand order of
the district court, with two minor exceptions.379 The first was a mischaracterization by the
district court of a passage in Pit River I which the court determined was, as “a practical matter,”
372
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a harmless error, and the second was a typographical error that both parties addressed in their
appellate briefs.380
V. CONCLUSION
The court in Pit River II established two precedents for future courts to consider. First,
the detailed analysis of when an appellate court has jurisdiction where there is no “final
decision” by a lower court provides a road map for district courts to use in the future. Second,
the court affirmatively established the vested right of a lessee to reclaim their lease even if the
original terms have expired during litigation, and all lease extensions have been invalidated.
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